



LABORatorio R. Revelli
Centre for Employment Studies

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a journey in less known regions of labour discomfort

by

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What does the ECHP tell us about labour status misperception: a journey in less known regions of labour discomfort

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Matteo Richiardi*

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Abstract

This study uses ECHP data to give insights on the characteristics of people whose self-assessment of labour status differs from that of the LFS. We do some 'labour accounting', in order to clarify the connection between individual perception and LFS categorisation. We find that discrepancies are frequent, regional differences are extremely relevant in explaining them and thus traditional statistics may be strongly biased in capturing people's well being in relationship with their labour status. We concentrate then on the most relevant perception errors, above all those connected with searching behaviour, in order to explain their determinants. What emerges is a map of social characteristics explaining discouragement and passive behaviour. Such an attitude is (paradoxically) reinforced by assistance from the state itself, such that it becomes – to a certain extent – 'institutionalised'. Finally, we show that our understanding of the relationship between misclassification and individual characteristics leads to a reduction in the measurement error to be dealt with in transition flows analysis.

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Introduction

The unemployment rate is probably the most used indicator of labour market performance and of the well-being of an economy as a whole, but in practice it is really difficult to categorise people as either in or out of the labour force or as employed/unemployed. To facilitate comparisons of labour market performance between countries and over time, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) has set forth guidelines for classifying individuals into different labour market states¹. In general, these guidelines have been followed by most statistical bureaus in preparing their labour force surveys; moreover, to achieve the goal of international comparability standardised statistics are compiled². According to ILO definitions, a person is considered unemployed if three requirements are satisfied: 1) the person is not working; 2) the person is currently available for work; 3) the person is actively seeking for a job.

While most labour economists agree that the first two criteria are quite straightforward, this is not the case for the third one, which defines the boundaries between unemployed, discouraged and inactive workers. Many studies have shown that the availability and willingness to work might be sufficient to categorise a worker as belonging to the labour force, especially in less developed countries, where search is usually more costly and where searching behaviour, given the importance of the rural sector and of family links, might be less meaningful (Byrne and Strobl, 2001). The issue has also been analysed in some developed countries, notably Canada and the US, where again it is recognised that correctly identifying those who are not searching according to the standard definitions may be difficult. But while in less developed countries the source of confusion is probably related to the organisation of the labour market as a whole, in industrialised countries it is more likely to be related to the characteristics of specific groups. For instance, Gonul (1992), finds evidence that while unemployment and out of the labour force are two distinguishable labour market states for women, this is not the case for men: according to Gonul, this happens because women are used to stay at home to look after children and thus they are generally more aware of whether they are searching or not for a job: if they are at home, looking after children, they are obviously not searching, while this might not be the case for men. Clark and Summer (1979), analysing a different group, conclude that in the case of teenagers it is not possible to distinguish between the two labour market states of unemployed and out of the labour force, while Flinn and Heckmann (1983) find opposite evidence for high school white male graduates.

What emerges from this studies is that the distinction between different labour market states is not always very clear and well-defined: people may not know how to classify themselves according to the standard definitions, or simply may have a perception of their labour market state different from that of labour economists; moreover, work and leisure are complex phenomena and they are hard to classify according to any definition.

As a consequence, in labour market surveys some inconsistencies might emerge between individual responses and the effective behaviour of the respondents. Were the discrepancies very significant, using the standard definitions to orient policy design could then be obviously misleading. Our study is an attempt to clarify the determinants of these differences and in this sense may shed some light

¹ the latest ILO international definitions of unemployment were adopted in October 1982 by the 13th International Conference of Labour Statisticians meeting in Geneva. This was an update and clarification of standards set in 1954.

² the four main statistical sources comparing unemployment rates across countries are the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) with its Standardized Unemployment Rates (SURs) program, the Statistical Office of the European Communities (Eurostat) and the International Labor Office (ILO) itself.

on some 'borderline' types of workers, unemployed, or inactive individuals, and thus on the existing controversy about the inadequacy of official labour market statistics.

More recently, the issue of the discrepancies between official definitions and individuals' responses to labour market surveys has gained a renewed interest, on the wake of the extraordinary labour market performance of the US compared to the more modest European one. The argument, at the risk of oversimplifying it, is that an accurate comparison of labour market performance between different countries should take into account all social, cultural and institutional factors that, though difficult to measure, greatly affect labour status perception. For example, differences in social welfare and educational systems, in demographic factors and in the attitude towards work and leisure may greatly affect the perception one has of his/her own activity status and therefore contribute to explain differences in activity rates between countries. If this were the case then looking at the official statistics without taking into account these factors would be seriously misleading. Commenting on the low unemployment rates in the US, Thurow (1999) points out that "nothing good happens by telling anyone official that you are unemployed", because that would be interpreted as a bad signal in a society where "you gain what you deserve"; but this might not be the case in a country with a high unemployment rate, where being unemployed is not perceived as the individual's own responsibility. In a very dynamic society, a precarious job might be perceived as a real job, but in a society still permeated by a culture of full-time/secure job this might not be the case. Thus, an individual occasionally taking some low paid and precarious job might perceive himself/herself as employed in the first case but as unemployed in the latter.

The job search itself might have different meanings in different countries: for instance, in a society based on strong familiar and social nets, being unemployed might be less dramatic than in a more individualistic society; as a consequence the job search might be less active than required by official statistics to be classified in the labour force. The individual enjoying such a protection might consider himself/herself as truly unemployed while not meeting the official definition of unemployed. Or more simply an individual might perceive himself/herself as unemployed even if not actively searching for a job just because he/she does not know what steps to take or because does not think a suitable job might be available.

The difficulty of comparing official labour market statistics is exacerbated by the fact that the structure of most labour markets now differ greatly from the general framework used to derive the standard definitions of employed, unemployed and out of the labour force. This framework was set by ILO when the prevailing type of employment was full-time male paid employment and a full range of employment protection measures were generally in place (ILO, 1994). Since then, the employment situation has greatly changed so that the traditional definitions may no longer be suited to capture the complexity of these phenomena.

In the last twenty years the labour markets in all the European countries have undergone a deep process of restructuring which has greatly contributed to change the meaning of work and leisure as they are generally understood. Many prime age men have lost their jobs in the manufacturing sector. This has raised again the issue of an unemployment crisis because the development of the service sector, while favouring the feminisation of the labour market, has not been strong enough to compensate for the decline of the employment in the traditional industrial sector. In the meantime, to face the new unemployment crisis new policy strategies have been implemented, which have greatly contributed to make the difference between employment and non-employment much less well-defined: part-time and other flexible labour contracts have become the ordinary way to enter the labour market in many European countries, while retirement pay-schemes have allowed many redundant workers to leave the labour force without suffering the consequences of unemployment.

A new, more unified, labour market has emerged in which the fixed and full time job is no longer the ordinary form of employment while many unskilled workers, still in working age, have been pushed out of the labour force.

Moreover, this process has greatly contributed to affect existing differences in the labour force's attitude and perception about the traditional concepts of employment and unemployment. One might argue that since this process has interested more or less all industrialised countries, this should reduce and make less relevant also the cultural and social differences in the perception of work and unemployment. Paradoxically, the same forces that undermine the validity of the traditional ILO definitions should also work – to a certain extent – in the direction of making them more universally applicable.

But we cannot deny that despite the presence of global forces tending to mitigate and impose a convergence in many social and cultural trends, there are still important cultural differences affecting the perception a community has of the social status of different labour conditions.

In conclusion, official labour market statistics are likely to be affected by a whole range of institutional, cultural and social factors which make their comparison particularly difficult. Our problem is then to study the impact of these factors on the validity of labour force categorisation and hence of labour force statistics. The European Community Household Panel (ECHP), which provides two different definitions of activity status, the standard Eurostat Labour Force Survey (LFS) definition following ILO guidelines, and the respondent's own self-assessment, can offer new insights on the importance of these factors, allowing to identify a separate perception component.

Finally, the difference between these two measures can provide insights on the issue of transition flows measurement. Confusion between different labour market states is a source of particular concern when transition between states is analysed. Some of the observed transitions may simply occur because of a change in classification, without any change in the underlying working situation. Moreover, changes in 'real' labour state not reflected in a corresponding change in classification may remain unobserved, or be attributed to a wrong transition. That is, when labour force status is observed with error, a bias will arise in the estimates of the transition probabilities³.

Suppose there is a 'true' state l^* for each individual i , based on a latent variable s :

$$[1] \quad \begin{aligned} s_i &= x_i' \beta + u_i \\ l_i^* &= j \quad \text{if} \quad s_i \in (c_L^j, c_H^j) \end{aligned}$$

where j can be, for instance, either 'unemployed' or 'employed' or 'inactive',
Unfortunately, only information on an observed status l is available, where:

$$[2] \quad \alpha_{jh} = pr[l_i = j | l_i^* = h] \quad , \quad \alpha_{jh} \in [0,1]$$

This implies:

$$[3] \quad pr[l_i = j] = \sum_{h \neq j} \alpha_{jh} [F(c_h^H - x_i \beta) - F(c_h^L - x_i \beta)] + (1 - \sum_{h \neq j} \alpha_{hj}) [F(c_j^H - x_i \beta) - F(c_j^L - x_i \beta)]$$

³ see for instance Poterba & Summers (1995), Hausman, Abrevaya & Scott-Morton (1998)

Measurement error is actually composed by two different errors: an *interviewer error* (m_i^I), due to coding mistakes, etc., and a *respondent error* (m_i^R), due to ‘wrong’ answers (i.e. answers not coherent with reality):

$$[2'] \quad \alpha_{jh} = pr[l_i = j | l_i^* = h] = m_{jh}^R + m_{jh}^I, \quad \alpha_{jh} \in [0,1]$$

While measurement error m_i is normally thought as a random process, and the probability α_{jh} therefore given exogenously, we advance the hypothesis that it may be partly explained. We still consider the interviewer error to be random, but we try to grasp a systematic component of m_i^R :

$$[2''] \quad \alpha_{jh} = pr[l_i = j | l_i^* = h] = g_{jh}(z_i' \gamma) + m_{jh}^I, \quad \alpha_{jh} \in [0,1]$$

Suppose transition flows are observed with reference to a self-assessed labour state classification, and that the ‘true’ labour force state could be grasped with a little more investigation. This amounts to say that an ILO classification, if available, could solve the respondent measurement problem altogether, leaving only the interviewer error left.

On the other hand, suppose only the ILO measure is observed, while the unobserved self-assessed classification is thought to be closer to the ‘true’ state of interest.

In both cases, the problem is that there is no link between the two measures. The difference between them is thought of as a purely random process.

This study, through estimates of m^R , provides (part of) the missing link, thus reducing the unexplained difference to a smaller random error.

The paper is organised as follows. In section 1 we introduce the ECHP data and discuss their coherence with other labour force statistics. In section 2 we analyse the discrepancies between the respondents’ and the LFS definitions of activity status in the ECHP survey. In section 3 we discuss their relevance, while in section 4 we investigate their impact on labour force statistics. In section 5 the framework for our regional analysis is set, while in sections 6 we investigate the determinants of the main types of discrepancies found. Section 7 deals with the above mentioned measurement errors problem, and finally section 8 contains the conclusions.

1. The data

The aim of this section is to present the data and assess their quality by comparing the main labour force statistics from the ECHP with those from other EU official sources.

The ECHP is a household panel set by Eurostat, the Statistical Office of the European Communities, providing detailed information on a number of demographic, social and economic variables of households and individuals since 1994. Citing from Nicoletti and Peracchi (2001), “[t]he target population of the ECHP consists of all individuals living in private households within the EU. In its first (1994) wave, the ECHP covered about 60,000 households and 130,000 individuals aged 16+ in 12 countries of the EU (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the UK). Austria, Finland and Sweden began to participate later, respectively from the second, third and fourth wave.

In Belgium and the Netherlands, the ECHP was linked from the beginning to already existing national panels. In Germany, Luxembourg and the UK, instead, the first three waves of the ECHP ran parallel to existing national panels with similar content, namely the German Social Economic

Panel (GSOEP), the Luxembourg's Social Economic Panel (PSELL) and the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS)".

When we started this study, wave 1 to 3 (1994, 1995 and 1996) of the User Data Base (UDB) were available; wave 4 (1997) has recently been released. Since the panel structure of the data has not proved useful, we focus on 1996 data, but for Italy and the Netherlands, where we suspect wave 3 data of being of lower quality (see below), and for which we used 1995 data. Due to a stability feature in the perception errors we investigate (see below), we are allowed to suggest that the findings of this study are still valid for more recent years: so one of the big disadvantages of large household panels – namely huge delays in the publication of data – brings only limited harm to us.

Previous studies (ECHP data quality, second report; Nicoletti and Peracchi, 2001; Peracchi, 2000) found that there is no relevant incoherence between the ECHP data on employment and unemployment and the LFS statistics, even if in the case of some countries, there are some large differences (see Appendix, table A1). Our own elaboration confirms these results: the comparison is generally good but the ECHP data, if we exclude Greece, tend to underestimate unemployment rates while overestimating activity rates (see Appendix, table A2). In some countries, activity rates decrease over time. In Italy the reduction is quite relevant, from 49% in the second wave to 44% in the third wave⁴. This observed trend cannot be entirely explained by the change in the composition of the sample, with older age groups, with lower participation rates, rising relatively to the other groups in later waves, and points towards a problem in data quality for at least one wave. This motivated our decision to use wave 2 data, since the first figure seems closer to LFS statistics. Wave 2 data were also chosen for the Netherlands because of an implausible frequency of one type of misperception in wave 3.

2. Misperception

The importance of ECHP data, as it has already been pointed out, is that they contain information both on an individual's self assessed labour status and on his/her LFS classification. The first information comes from a question about the individual's *main* activity status. Each of the following categories can be chosen:

Table 1: Main activity status, self assessed

<i>Codes</i>	<i>Labels</i>
1	paid employment (15+ hours / week)
2	paid apprenticeship (15+ hours / week)
3	training under special schemes related to employment (15+ hours / week)
4	self-employment (15+ hours / week)
5	unpaid family (15+ hours / week)
6	education / training
7	unemployed
8	retired
9	housework
10	community / military service
11	other economically inactive
12	working less than 15 hours
Source: ECHP – UDB, data dictionary and description of variables	

⁴ aggregate statistics for wave 1 are not directly comparable with other waves or with other sources due to a problem in data weighting.

Then, the three macro-categories of employed, unemployed and inactive are formed, according to the following rules:

Table 2: Main activity status, reclassification

<i>Codes</i>	<i>Labels</i>	
1	normally working (15+ hours / week)	main activity status in (1,..., 5)
2	unemployed	main activity status = 7
3	inactive	main activity status in (6, 8, ... 12)
Source: ECHP – UDB, data dictionary and description of variables		

On the basis of this self-classification and of answers to other questions (in particular those related to job searching activities), ECHP data provide an additional classification of each individual's activity status according to ILO classification rules as described in the box below (details on this variable construction rules are provided in the Appendix).

ILO classification rules

Working Age

Working age is taken as ages 16 to 59 for females and 16 to 64 for males.

In Employment

People are classified as employed by the LFS, if they have done at least one hour of work in the reference week.

ILO Unemployment

The International Labour Organisation (ILO) measure of unemployment used throughout this statistics notice refers to people without a job who were available to start work in the two weeks following their LFS interview and had either looked for work in the four weeks prior to interview or were waiting to start a job they had already obtained. This definition of unemployment is in accordance with that adopted by the 14th International Conference of Labour Statisticians and promulgated by the ILO in 1987.

The ILO unemployment rate is the percentage of economically active people who are unemployed on the ILO measure.

Economically Active

People aged 16 and over who are either in employment or ILO unemployed.

Economically Inactive

People who are neither in employment nor unemployed on the ILO measure. This group includes, for example, all those who were looking after a home or retired. Although no estimates appear in this bulletin, for other LFS analyses, this group would also include all people aged under 16.

Discouraged Workers

This is a sub-group of the economically inactive population, defined as those neither in employment nor unemployed (on the ILO measure) who said they would like a job and whose main reason for not seeking work was because they believed there were no jobs available.

Full-time/Part-time

The classification of employees, self-employed, those on government work-related training programmes and unpaid family workers in their main job as full-time or part-time is on the basis of self-assessment. People on Government supported training and employment programmes who are at college in the survey reference week are classified, by convention, as part-time.

In order to make the two classifications comparable, when we talk of self assessed employed people we add those who declare to work less than 15 hours per week (code 12 in table 1 above) to those classified as 'normally working' (code 1 in table 2 above).

Our aim is to use ECHP data in order to investigate differences between LFS classification and self assessed classification of labour status. We will argue that in some cases the existence of such differences can be of social concern, and we will then investigate the determinants of this misperception.

Previous studies found that “around 95% of the individuals are classified identically according to the two measures. There are some slight differences related to changes in the questionnaire from Wave 1 to Wave 2 (the questionnaire became 'stabilised' from Wave 2 onwards in this respect). For instance, the proportion of self-declaring themselves as 'unemployed' according to the main status approach but classified as 'inactive' according to the LFS approach is higher in Wave 1 compared to Wave 2. Though there are a few anomalies not easily explained”⁵. Fisher et al., (2000), aggregating results by country and weighting by population size, found that over 90% of the respondents reported the same current and main activity status, and that age and sex seem to account for the differences⁶. It is recognised that respondents may not agree with the LFS criteria and that, since the LFS definition of current activity status gives priority “to any work and unemployment over inactivity and to any work as marking a person as employed rather than as unemployed”, then a number of features, which could affect the individual’s perception of the activity status, are lost in the LFS reclassification. We do believe that differences in the questionnaire between the three waves cannot entirely account for the discrepancies found and, following Fisher et al., we investigate the determinants of these discrepancies.

A word must be spent on why we think of this difference as being caused by misperception, rather than more generally by an erroneous declaration (misdeclaration). An individual could intentionally make a false declaration, for instance in case he/she is employed in the underground economy, and wants to hide his/her illegal activity. But in these cases, a good liar would make such a coherent false declaration that imputation of LFS activity status on the basis of his/her answers would not produce anything discordant. Thus, a discordance is *always* caused by a misperception, although sometimes this is of no social relevance. This also suggests that ECHP data is not suited for an analysis of the underground economy.

We do not consider the case of someone holding the ‘right’ perception of his/her labour status but erroneously giving a wrong answer to require a special treatment. This is likely to happen in those ‘fuzzy’ situations as a part-time job involving only a few hours of work a week. Of course we expect – as it will be made clear below – such situations to increase the likelihood of a misdeclaration. In some cases this appears to be of potential social concern, in some others it seems more irrelevant. However, the main point we want to stress is that *any* misdeclaration implies to a certain extent a misperception, if we agree with the LFS classification. We are concerned with those misperception that could represent a social problem, and we’ll try to investigate their social and economic causes.

If we consider three labour status (employed, unemployed and inactive), there are six possible cases of misperception:

1. an individual can classify himself/herself as unemployed, but be classified as employed according to LFS definitions (hereafter **UE**, where the first letter refers to the self-definition and the latter to LFS status);
2. an individual can classify himself/herself as inactive, but be LFS classified as employed (**IE**);
3. an individual can self-define himself/herself as inactive, but be LFS classified as unemployed (**IU**);
4. an individual can self-define himself/herself as employed, but be LFS classified as unemployed (**EU**);
5. an individual can self-define himself/herself as unemployed, but be LFS classified as inactive (**UI**);

⁵ECHP data quality. Second report, pp.58.

⁶ we also agree on the importance of sex and age, but only for some type of perception errors (see below)

6. and finally an individual can classify himself/herself as employed, but be classified as inactive according to LFS definitions (**EI**).

We believe that only four out of these six misclassification errors are of interest – namely **UI** (those who are inactive but believe they're unemployed, probably the single more relevant perception error in terms of social consequences), **IU** (those who are unemployed but believe they're inactive), **UE** (those who are currently employed but believe they are unemployed) and **IE** (those who are employed but regard themselves as being inactive).

The decision to ignore the other two groups is motivated by the following.

There are no EU guys: according to the LFS variable construction rule, it was not possible to be classified as LFS unemployed while declaring to be employed. This also confirms that the questionnaire was not designed to investigate participation in the underground economy.

The number of EI guys is very small (139 out of 130,611 observations, or 0,1% of the total. Moreover, most of them (78%) declare to be working less than 15 hours per week. Thus, we discard this group as not relevant.

When the focus is on the four perception errors described above, a further distinction is possible.

Among the people who are classified as LFS inactive, but who perceive themselves as being unemployed, some are not searching for a job at all, while others are engaging in a job search, although not an active search as required by LFS standards to be classified as unemployed. We call the first group **UI1 (no search)**, and the latter **UI2 (no active search)**.

As for what regards people who are classified as LFS unemployed but declare to be inactive, it is possible to distinguish between those who pursue a correct search (and thus have all the *substantial* requisites to be 'real' unemployed) and those who are classified as LFS unemployed for more *formal* reasons (people that have already been assigned a job, but are waiting to start it, people who are awaiting for the results of an application...). We call the first group **IU1 (correct search)**, and the latter **IU2 (purely conventional reasons)**. It is clear that it is the first group of most interest, since no matter they behave like 'real' unemployed, they do not lament their condition. We will concentrate only on this group.

UE group (people who are classified as employed but declare to be unemployed) and IE group (people who are classified as employed but declare to be inactive) are made only of temporary or part-time workers. Here, the difference between self-declaration and the LFS classification has to be mainly attributed to the questionnaire design, since the question was about *main* activity status. That is, many people could have correctly identified their main activity status as unemployed or inactive (students, retired persons...) even if they have a small or occasional job. However, we still consider these groups to be of interest, because these people are probably the most 'active' among their respective activity group (unemployed, students, retired people, house workers...). We face two interesting a-priori hypothesis on why they do not simply consider themselves to be part-time workers. According to the first, the part-time occupation is simply not important enough. People declaring this part-time job as their main activity signal they rely more on it. The second hypothesis draws from the 'institutional' argument we will discuss in details below: give someone a particular label (even better if you attach some money to it), and he/she will use it as his/her personal card. It's quite likely that someone holding a pension will declare to be retired, even if still working part-time. There is a third, less interesting for the purposes of this study, hypothesis, in which people making a UE or a IE type misperception signal they decided not to or were not able to hide their participation in the underground economy (they are then the most 'honest' among the 'dishonest').

To summarise, we concentrate on the following perception errors:

- UI1 : LFS inactive, self assessed unemployed, no job search;
- UI2 : LFS inactive, self assessed unemployed, no active search;
- IU1 : LFS unemployed, self assessed inactive, active search;
- UE : LFS part-time workers, self assessed unemployed
- IE : LFS part-time workers, self assessed inactive

In some sense, the UI groups are the most problematic, since someone who perceives himself as unemployed but does not struggle to find a job is likely to share the same unhappiness and frustration of a ‘real’ unemployed, but with a smaller probability to get out of this state. It is clear that the first perception error (no search at all) is much worse than the second (passive search).

People in the IU group can be labelled as ‘unaware’: we expect them to be included in a social safety net that lessens the harsh of unemployment. Being in this group is *a priori* no good or bad, but a sign of (relative) ‘good luck’, with possibly a positive impact on the overall well being of the individual.

Finally, as described above, being in the UE or IE group can signal a particular active attitude with respect to unemployment or exclusion from the labour force, but also a lack of interest in the part-time job, if our first hypothesis turns out to be correct. The first attitude is clearly ‘positive’ from a social perspective. On the other hand, in the “lack of centrality” hypothesis it is the situation of the non misperceptors – those that show a strong interest in their part-time job – that can be problematic, since some of them could be forced to make their living out of a part-time work, while still preferring a full time occupation⁷.

3. The relevance of misperception

But how relevant are these perception errors? The table below shows that 26.2% of all people who perceive themselves as unemployed are recorded as inactive by the official statistics provided by the national statistical office (“Indagine trimestrale sulla forza lavoro”) in Italy, thus committing a UI type perception error. The frequency of this misperception goes as high as 57.7% in the Netherlands, 49.1% in Belgium and just above 40% in Denmark, Austria and Portugal, while it goes down to 12.6% in Great Britain and 12.5% in Greece.

Conversely, 4.9% of all people declaring to be inactive are (‘officially’) unemployed in Italy. This figure remains high for Spain (4.7%) and Finland (4.3%), reaching a low of 0.8% in Portugal and 0.2% in Greece.

Moreover, in Italy 4.1% of self assessed unemployed are ‘officially’ working, a perception error committed by 19.4% of self assessed unemployed in the Netherlands, and by just 0.7% in France. Finally, only 1.4% of self assessed inactive are ‘officially’ working in Italy, while in the Netherlands this figure is as high as 15.9%, in Denmark reaches 12.9%, and it goes down to around 1% in Spain and Greece, and to 0.8% in France.

⁷ many people choose to work part-time as the optimal choice given their other activities (like bearing children, or simply enjoying rents), but we suppose that most people declaring to be part-time workers are forced to make this choice, and would opt for a full-time, if they could.


Table 3 – Relevance of perception errors

	* over self-defined (s.d.) unemployed ** over s.d. inactive *** over s.d. employed						
	UI*	IU**	UE*	EU***	EI***	IE**	s.d & LFS unempl. *
ITALY (a)	26.2%	4.9%	4.1%	0.0%	0.0%	1.4%	69.7%
GERMANY	28.6%	1.9%	3.6%	0.0%	0.0%	8.7%	67.8%
GREAT BRITAIN	12.6%	3.6%	4.9%	0.0%	0.1%	7.7%	82.5%
PORTUGAL	40.2%	0.8%	4.6%	0.0%	0.1%	4.6%	55.2%
NETHERLANDS(a)	57.7%	1.1%	19.4%	0.0%	0.0%	15.9%	23.0%
BELGIUM	49.1%	2.0%	6.5%	0.0%	1.0%	4.1%	43.9%
SPAIN	20.4%	4.7%	2.5%	0.0%	0.0%	1.0%	77.0%
FRANCE	24.4%	2.5%	0.7%	0.0%	1.1%	0.8%	70.6%
GREECE	12.5%	0.2%	2.4%	0.0%	0.1%	1.1%	85.2%
DENMARK	41.8%	2.3%	2.5%	0.0%	0.0%	12.1%	55.8%
AUSTRIA	41.2%		1.8%	0.0%	0.0%	4.8%	54.3%
IRELAND	30.2%	2.1%	4.3%	0.0%	0.1%	5.7%	65.3%
LUXEMBURG	33.3%	1.7%	2.8%	0.0%	0.3%	3.9%	63.9%
FINLAND	23.3%	4.3%	5.4%	0.0%	0.1%	4.7%	71.3%
1996 (wave 3) data							
(a) 1995 (wave 2) data							

So, perception errors matter. In particular, ‘bad’ mistakes as UI and UE (when people perceive themselves as unemployed, the worst possible state) matter. Moreover, national differences are extremely relevant. Finally, traditional statistics may be strongly biased in capturing people’s well being in relationship with their labour status. Of all self assessed unemployed, only 70% are also LFS classified as such in Italy. This figure goes down to almost 50% in Portugal, Denmark and Austria, doesn’t arrive to 44% in Belgium and reaches a bare 23% in the Netherlands! (last column).

Moreover, perception errors appear to be quite persistent, with the exception of UE group: around 50 % of respondents who do not change their labour state from wave 2 to wave 3 still report the same wrong activity status, as described in the figure below.


Table 4 – Persistence of perception errors: exception flows of people who do not change their ILO labour state from wave 2 to wave 3



The fact that what counts, in terms of personal well being, is the *perceived* labour status, rather than the *true* labour status (as classified by LFS standards) is confirmed when looking at the correlation of perception errors and satisfaction level⁸. Perceiving to be unemployed is worse than perceiving to be inactive, given (LFS) inactivity; conversely, perceiving to be inactive is better than perceiving to be unemployed, given (LFS) unemployment. Moreover, perceiving to be unemployed is worse – and perceiving to be inactive better – than perceiving to be a part-time worker, given the individual is an (LFS) part-time worker.

⁸ the questionnaire asks about the satisfaction with work or main activity, ranging from 1 – not satisfied – to 6 – fully satisfied.

Figure 1 – Diffusion of perception errors and satisfaction levels



UI are in % of all inactive, IU are in % of all unemployed

UE are in % of all non-IE part-time workers, IE are in % of all non-UE part-time workers

A first look at the numbers above could suggest a stereotypical interpretation, going down more or less like this: “Family links in Italy and Spain are stronger, and thus unemployed persons are more likely not to perceive the harshness of their status (high frequency of IU misperception); individualism in Great Britain is strong, and thus people tend not to blame others for their personal situation, while in Greece this may be due to a weaker state (low frequency of UI misperception); labour legislation favouring part-time in the Netherlands explain the sky-high frequency of UE and IE misperception in this country”. The remaining of the paper is devoted to better qualify this.

4. Misperception and labour force statistics

At this point, it could be asked how it is possible to rely on traditional statistics as the unemployment rate, when overall only around 3 in 4 people who feel unemployed are counted in. The fact is: ‘official statistics’ do not necessarily reflect what people feel, they are measuring something else. Moreover, some perception errors offset each other. Self-definition and LFS classification are linked by the following identities:

$$[4] \quad \text{s.d. unemployed} = \text{LFS unemployed} - \text{IU} - \text{EU} + \text{UI} + \text{UE}$$

$$[5] \quad \text{s.d. employed} = \text{LFS employed} - \text{IE} - \text{UE} + \text{EI} + \text{EU}$$


$$[6] \quad \text{s.d. inactive} = \text{LFS inactive} - \text{UI} - \text{EI} + \text{IU} + \text{IE}$$

Let’s confine our attention to the first one. Since $\text{EU} = 0$, it reduces to

$$[4'] \quad \text{s.d. unemployed} = \text{LFS unemployed} - \text{IU} + \text{UI} + \text{UE}$$

The intersection set – i.e. the set of people who are at the same time both self assessed and LFS unemployed – is small compared to the self assessed set when UI and UE misperception are large, and is small compared to the LFS set when IU is large.

Figure 2 – LFS and self assessed unemployment



However, even if IU, UI and UE may partially offset each other, when statistics based on LFS classification are to be used as an estimate for self-perceived unemployment, the risk of big mistakes remains high:

Table 5 – Difference between self assessed unemployment and LFS unemployment

	<i>Difference *</i>
ITALY (a)	2.2%
GERMANY	15.1%
GREAT BRITAIN	-24.8%
PORTUGAL	36.9%
NETHERLANDS(a)	72.6%
BELGIUM	43.9%
SPAIN	0.7%
FRANCE	12.9%
GREECE	13.5%
DENMARK	30.9%
AUSTRIA	20.4%
IRELAND	19.7%
LUXEMBURG	-5.6%
FINLAND	13.1%
* (s.d unemployment – LFS unemployment) over LFS unemployment	

5. The regional dimension

We have seen that perception errors differ greatly across countries. They also differ within countries, across regions. We want to investigate how and why this happens. However, the number of observations is too small to allow a ‘true’ regional analysis (due to the relative small incidence of each type of perception error). We need then a territorial criterion to aggregate regions. We used the EU structural funds objective 1, 2 and 5b eligibility status of each region. These objectives are the only geographical objectives of the 1996-2001 structural funds, since obj. 3, 5a and 6 refer to any EU region, regardless of its characteristics. Objective 1 was aimed to promoting the development and structural adjustment of the EU regions most lagging behind in development, while Objective 2

was aimed to supporting the economic and social conversion of areas seriously affected by industrial decline, and Objective 5b to facilitating the development and structural adjustment of rural areas⁹.

Since objective 5b eligibility appeared to be decisive only in a handful of regions, our final classification is based only on obj. 1 and 2 eligibility.

Thus, each region in our dataset can be one classified in one of the following groups:

Table 6 – Structural funds eligibility and regional classification

<i>Group</i>	<i>Label</i>	<i>obj. 1 eligibility</i>	<i>obj. 2b eligibility</i>	<i>No. of observations</i>	<i>% of total sample</i>
1	Declining Industrial Regions	N	P	46,087	35.29
2	Agro-Industrial Regions	P	P	30,364	23.25
3	Metropolitan Regions	N	N	5,043	3.86
4	Agricultural Regions	T	N	45,123	34.55
(missing)		3,994	3.05		
total		126,617	100.00		
N = not eligible; P = partially eligible; T = totally eligible					

Regions in group 1 are those who are only partially eligible for objective 2b. We may call them ‘Declining Industrial Regions’. Regions in group 2 are partially eligible for both objectives. We will refer to these mixed-specialisation regions as ‘Agro-Industrial Regions’. Regions in group 3 are London, Paris, Bruxelles and Amsterdam regions: we will call them ‘Metropolitan Regions’.

Finally, group 4 regions are mainly ‘Agricultural Regions’, with no objective 2 areas. It is important to note that these regions are fully eligible for objective 1 structural funds contribution.

The full list of EU regions with group belonging is reported in the Appendix. Note that region of residence information is not available for German and Dutch data. Thus, we can only use national data on structural funds distribution for these two countries. Since Germany and the Netherlands are on the whole partially eligible for both objective 1 and objective 2b contributions, all observations for these countries are classified in group 2.

Sample activity rates and participation rates are more or less similar across the four groups, with the exception of Agricultural regions, where they are significantly lower. Agro-Industrial regions have the lowest sample unemployment rate, followed by Declining Industrial regions and Metropolitan regions. Again, Agricultural regions have the worse figures, with an unemployment rate of 13.6%.

Agro-Industrial regions have the highest figure for UI1 (LFS inactive, self assessed unemployed, no job search) and IE (LFS part-time workers, self assessed inactive) perception errors. Declining Industrial regions and Metropolitan regions have the highest incidence of IU errors.

⁹with the new Framework Programme of the European Commission (2002-2006) objective names, goals and targets have been changed

Table 7 – Misperception and regional classification

<i>Misperception</i>	<i>Macro-regions</i>							
	Declining Industrial		Agro-Industrial		Metropolitan		Agricultural	
UI1 *	355	1.9%	672	5.5%	54	2.6%	477	2.2%
UI2 *	332	1.8%	203	1.7%	35	1.7%	389	1.8%
IU **	574	24.7%	248	19.1%	65	24.0%	558	17.4%
UE ***	105	0.4%	207	1.2%	7	0.3%	121	0.6%
IE ***	820	3.2%	1008	6.0%	36	1.3%	561	2.7%
participation rate		60.2%		59.5%		58.7%		52.4%
unemployment rate		8.4%		7.2%		9.2%		13.6%
activity rate		55.1%		55.2%		53.3%		45.3%
*	over inactive							
**	over unemployed							
***	over employed							

6. The determinants of misperception

We do not provide a formal theory of misperception. We simply divide the determinants of misperception in three categories:

- institutional determinants
- economic determinants, and
- social determinants

Institutional factors refer to those situations when there is a social recognition of a particular labour status (as in the case of unemployment benefits, or pensions). It can happen that LFS classification does not correspond to this ‘social visa’. For instance, one person can receive a scholarship, but still work a few hours a week in order to increase his/her income. In such cases, we expect the existence of these allowances to increase the probability of a misperception.

Economic and social factors affect misperception in many ways. To start with, they normally affect the institutional factors¹⁰. In the case of the UI group, they are directly linked with the ‘victimisation hypothesis’, according to which beyond a certain threshold of (perceived) economic and social distress individuals tend to blame the society for their personal situation, and thus switch the responsibility for an improvement from themselves to the state. In the case of IU group, they are connected with the safety net effect described above.

In order to investigate the determinants of the four categories of misperception described above, we run separate logit regressions, comparing each misperception group with the corresponding correct perception group. Thus, our logit regression for the UI compares being an UI with being a II, i.e. declaring to be unemployed *versus* declaring to be inactive, given that the individual is classified as an LFS inactive. The logit regression for the IU compares declaring to be inactive *versus* declaring to be unemployed, given that the individual is classified as an LFS unemployed, and so forth. Note that UE and IE are both regressed against EE: thus, IE observations are excluded from UE regression, and vice versa.

¹⁰ but since this causal relationship differ from country to country due to different legislation on social protection – and we put observations from different countries together – it is still convenient to include the institutional factors among the regressors.

Regressors include personal information – sex, age, citizenship, legal status (whether one is married), instruction – household information – dimension of household, existence of children to be cared of, location in an area with crime or vandalism problems – and income information.

Now, it is important to note that misperception may reveal something about work determination, and thus about unobservable ability. In the case of the UI group for example, it is intuitive to link misperception to the individual being a ‘low type’ worker. Including income information among the regressors could thus lead to an endogeneity problem, since income may in turn depend on such determination, or unobserved ability (and thus on the perception error).

Fortunately, this is not the case in the UI and IU regressions, since we are confident to assume that being an UI rather than an II – or a IU rather than a UU – does not affect income. The main reason is that there is no work income here. Non-work private income (capital income, private transfers) can be thought to be independent of whether one *admits* or not to be inactive, or unemployed¹¹. Unemployment benefits and other social receipts are not generally granted after a simple declaration to be unemployed.

Conversely, IE and UE regressions are affected by this endogeneity problem, which introduces a correlation between work income and the errors. We tackle this problem by instrumenting income in the IE and UE regressions.

Although the questionnaire asks important questions about health status and satisfaction level, we do not include any of these variables among the regressors, since the number of missing data becomes significant, and selection biases could be introduced. Country dummies are included.

The full list of variables used in the regressions is reported in the table below:

Table 8 – Explanatory variables

Code	Description	dummy	UI	IU	UE	IE	IV income
PE003	LFS MAIN ACTIVITY DURING CURRENT YEAR						
pe003_4	* discouraged *	x	o				
PE005	TOTAL HOURS WORKING / WEEK				o	o	o
pe005sq	squared				o	o	o
HD004	EQUIVALISED SIZE, OECD SCALE		o	o		o	
HI100ecu	TOTAL NET HOUSEHOLD INCOME		o	o	o	o	
hi100esq	squared		o	o	o	o	
PI110ECU	TOTAL NET INCOME FROM WORK				o	o	
pi110esq	squared				o	o	
PI131ecu	UNEMPLOYMENT RELATED BENEFITS		o	o	o		
PI131esq	squared		o	o	o		
PI132ecu	OLD-AGE / SURVIVORS' BENEFITS		o	o		o	
PI132esq	squared		o	o		o	
PI133ECU	FAMILY-RELATED ALLOWANCES		o	o		o	
PI133esq	squared		o	o		o	
PI134ECU	SICKNESS/INVALIDITY BENEFITS		o	o		o	
PI134esq	squared		o	o		o	
PI135ECU	EDUCATION-RELATED ALLOWANCES		o	o		o	
PI135esq	squared		o	o		o	
HF002	IS THE HOUSEHOLD ABLE TO MAKE ENDS MEET						
hf002_no	* with some difficulty - with great difficulty *				o	o	
HF013	MONEY LEFT FOR THE HOUSEHOLD TO SAVE (CONSIDERING HOUSEHOLD'S INCOME AND EXPENSES)						
hf013_2	* no or very little *	x	o	o	o	o	
HA022	IS THERE CRIME OR VANDALISM IN THE AREA						

¹¹ non-work income could depend on whether one is unemployed rather than inactive. For instance, inactive people could have decided to drop out of the labour force exactly because of sufficient capital income. Elderly people could receive private transfers from their relatives. But the distinction here is whether one *declares* to be unemployed, rather than inactive.

ha022_1	* yes *	x	o	o	o	o	o
HL002	CHILDREN LOOKED AFTER ON A REGULAR BASIS						
hl002_1	* yes *	x	o	o	o	o	
PD003	AGE OF THE INDIVIDUAL		o	o	o	o	o
pd003sq	squared		o	o	o	o	o
PD004	SEX OF THE INDIVIDUAL						
pd004_2	* female *	x	o	o	o	o	o
PD005	MARITAL STATUS OF THE PERSON						
pd005_1	* married *	x	o	o	o	o	
PT001	HAS THE PERSON BEEN IN EDUCATION OR TRAINING RECENTLY						
pt001_1	* yes *	x	o	o		o	
PT022	HIGHEST LEVEL OF GENERAL OR HIGHER EDUCATION COMPLETED						
pt022_3	* Less than second stage of secondary education *	x	o	o	o	o	
PH001	HEALTH OF THE PERSON IN GENERAL						o
PM008	CITIZENSHIP						
pm008_ex	* Other citizenship (Extra-EU) or Not national, but citizenship unknown *	x	o	o	o	o	o
EMPL12	S.D. EMPLOYED IN THE LAST 12 MONTHS	x	o	o			
PE017	USE OF A FOREIGN LANGUAGE IN CURRENT JOB						
pe017_1	* yes *						o

The UI group

A fundamental variable we introduce in the regression of the likelihood of declaring to be unemployed, when inactive, is whether the individual does not search for a job because he/she is discouraged. We expect being discouraged to affect positively this likelihood. As it turns out, this is the single most important factor in explaining this type of misperception.

Among the income variables, we include data on total net household income and on personal social allowances. Household income could affect UI misperception in two ways: living in a poor household could increase awareness and personal responsibility, and thus lower the likelihood of a misperception, or it could increase the attribution of the ultimate responsibility of such an uncomfortable situation to the state, and thus increase the likelihood of a misperception. Hence, a positive coefficient would support the ‘victimisation hypothesis’. The same applies to other indicators of social distress, such as localisation in a low-security area and a dummy variable signalling whether the household does not manage to save money.

Social receipts are introduced as control variables. Unfortunately, since German data on these income variables are missing, we have to drop all German observations from our sample. We run a separate regression for this country¹², and investigate whether the other effects differ significantly from other Agro-Industrial regions (recall all German observations belong to the same group, since region of living information is also missing). We obviously expect unemployment benefits to increase the likelihood of a misperception, and other social allowances related to inactivity status to decrease it. However, the size of these effects and their variability across regions could shed light on the importance of what we called the ‘institutional effect’.

¹² data are available on request

Table 9 - UI regression

UI	Declining Industrial regions				Agro-Industrial regions				Metropolitan regions				Agricultural regions			
Number of	18310				9041				2065				21388			
Wald chi2	907.26	33	d.o.f.		537	30	d.o.f.		198	27	d.o.f.		1306	29	d.o.f.	
	Odds Ratio	Robust std. Errors	95% Confidence Interval		Odds Ratio	Robust std. Errors	95% Confidence Interval		Odds Ratio	Robust std. Errors	95% Confidence Interval		Odds Ratio	Robust std. Errors	95% Confidence Interval	
pe003_4	17.002	3.889	10.859	26.620	12.92	5.562	198.050	30.042	21.50	14.321	5.825	79.331	17.11	2.435	12.946	22.615
hd004	1.003	0.098	0.828	1.214	0.937	0.080	0.793	1.108	0.991	0.266	0.585	1.678	1.189	0.067	1.065	1.327
hi100ecu	0.996	0.001	0.995	0.998	0.999	0.001	0.998	1.001	0.997	0.001	0.994	1.000	0.999	0.001	0.997	1.000
hi100esq	1.000	0.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.000	1.000	1.000
pi131ecu	1.070	0.008	1.054	1.087	1.054	0.008	1.039	1.070	1.069	0.012	1.046	1.092	1.141	0.013	1.117	1.166
pi131esq	1.000	0.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.000	1.000	1.000	0.999	0.000	0.999	0.999
pi132ecu	0.970	0.006	0.958	0.981	0.988	0.003	0.981	0.995	0.963	0.016	0.932	0.996	0.915	0.013	0.889	0.942
pi132esq	1.000	0.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.000	1.000	1.000
pi133ecu	0.999	0.004	0.991	1.007	0.995	0.007	0.981	1.009	0.991	0.012	0.967	1.015	0.984	0.036	0.916	1.056
pi133esq	1.000	0.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.000	0.999	1.001
pi134ecu	0.976	0.007	0.962	0.990	0.994	0.002	0.990	0.999	1.011	0.029	0.956	1.070	0.902	0.020	0.864	0.943
pi134esq	1.000	0.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.000	0.999	1.000	1.000	0.000	1.000	1.000
pi135ecu	0.901	0.033	0.838	0.968	0.946	0.035	0.881	1.017	3.254	2.741	0.624	16.965	0.834	0.154	0.580	1.198
pi135esq	1.001	0.000	1.000	1.001	1.001	0.001	0.999	1.002	0.760	0.144	0.525	1.102	1.002	0.003	0.997	1.008
ha022_1	1.288	0.226	0.914	1.816	1.005	0.130	0.779	1.295	1.144	0.422	0.555	2.359	0.803	0.116	0.605	1.066
hf013_2	1.027	0.141	0.785	1.344	1.274	0.139	1.028	1.577	1.076	0.484	0.445	2.598	1.244	0.191	0.921	1.680
hl002_1	1.072	0.385	0.530	2.168	2.015	0.636	1.086	3.742	1.006	0.972	0.151	6.691	1.540	0.474	0.843	2.814
pd003	1.133	0.039	1.060	1.212	1.446	0.067	1.321	1.583	1.006	0.067	0.883	1.147	1.147	0.031	1.088	1.210
pd003sq	0.998	0.000	0.997	0.999	0.995	0.001	0.994	0.996	1.000	0.001	0.998	1.001	0.998	0.000	0.997	0.999
pd004_2	0.442	0.074	0.318	0.615	0.539	0.090	0.388	0.748	1.755	0.791	0.725	4.247	0.340	0.046	0.261	0.444
pd005_1	0.389	0.074	0.268	0.564	0.829	0.151	0.580	1.186	0.899	0.500	0.302	2.675	0.161	0.027	0.116	0.224
pt001_1	0.222	0.049	0.145	0.341	0.425	0.106	0.261	0.692	0.412	0.335	0.084	2.028	0.090	0.016	0.063	0.129
pt022_3	0.870	0.116	0.670	1.130	0.862	0.096	0.693	1.073	1.046	0.365	0.527	2.073	0.875	0.115	0.676	1.133
pm008_ex	2.405	1.083	0.995	5.813	1.194	0.356	0.665	2.142	1.880	0.971	0.684	5.172	dropped (predicts failure perfectly): 66 obs. not used			
empl12	2.805	0.435	2.069	3.802	2.921	0.640	1.901	4.488	3.299	1.491	1.361	7.999	3.457	0.515	2.582	4.628

The discouragement effect and the victimisation hypothesis

As we anticipated, discouragement is the single most important factor in explaining this type of misperception. Being discouraged increases the odds ratio of an order of magnitude. The effect is stronger in Metropolitan regions, which is what it would be expected.

Discouraged people don't consider themselves completely out of the labour force: they simply assume a more passive attitude. If we think of human action as the ability of using tools in order to reach goals (either consciously or unconsciously) we could say that the process of dropping out of the labour force involves two stages. People first loose the tool, then the goal itself. This is confirmed by the fact that almost 63% of all discouraged people in our sample declare to be unemployed.

Age is also very important, with a 13% increase in the odds ratio in Declining Industrial regions for each additional year, and almost 50% increase in Agro-Industrial regions. This can be interpreted following the discouragement hypothesis. As times goes by, search efforts are reduced. Moreover, if actions are decided rationally, they should be positively linked to their expected benefits. Since search is costly (and it becomes even more so with age), the likelihood of getting a job decreases with age, and expected benefits from a job also decrease (at least because expected remaining lifetime decreases) the intensity of the job search should diminish. When it falls below a threshold, the individual is not classified anymore as unemployed by LFS rules, while continuing to be interested in getting a job.

The other side of this psychological interpretation is that a recent period of work should increase the feeling of being unemployed, even if no search is conducted. In some sense, we could say that long-term unemployed share with recently unemployed people the same tendency to 'passive' behaviour. Individuals keep a 'memory' of what they recently did, and this affects the perception of their present situation. Thus, if they were unemployed, it is likely that they hold the impression they should still be considered so, even if they are not performing an active search anymore. On the other hand, if they were employed, it is possible that they hold the impression they should be given another job, no matter what they do in order to get it. The result is the same: an inclination towards UI type misperception. This is confirmed by the positive coefficient of the variable 'empl12' (a dummy signalling whether the individual declared at least once to be employed in the 12 months preceding the interview), with a three times increase in the odds ratio. Having reached the goal (of a job) once can induce people to think they gained a permanent right to it.

This is clearly linked with the 'victimisation hypothesis' we already introduced. When people stop searching for a job, while still thinking they are entitled to one, they are assuming the society should take care for themselves. There are other pieces of evidence supporting this interpretation. First of all, total household income affects misperception in a negative (and almost linear over the range considered) way. Poor people are thus more likely to be affected by a UI perception error. Immigrants are slightly less likely to commit this error¹³, coherently with the intuition they have probably less claims towards a society that is already hosting them.

Since the victimisation hypothesis is strongly linked to the concept of responsibility, we should expect UI misperception to be less common in more liberal countries, where the stress on individualism is stronger. We believe this phenomenon is partly due to cultural reasons and education, and partly to the fact that discouragement becomes more costly when the social safety net is weaker. Thus, discouragement should be less common in more liberal countries¹⁴. This trend is found in the data: being in Great Britain for instance reduces the odds ratio by a half in Declining

¹³ in Germany very are more likely to commit it, with an odds ratio 3 times higher.

¹⁴ on the other side, deep discouragement could well be more widespread

Industrial regions and Agricultural regions, and by almost a factor of ten in Agro-Industrial regions¹⁵. On the opposite, living in more socialist countries like Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark or Finland increases the odds ratio by two to three times.

Women are much less likely to commit a UI error (odds ratio are reduced by roughly a half¹⁶). Only in Metropolitan regions this effect is not relevant, as gender becomes less important in determining attitude towards life in general. Also, being married reduces the likelihood of an error. The effect is stronger in Agricultural regions, where marriage is a stronger social convention, and is not relevant in Metropolitan regions, where it is weaker.

Moreover, the discouragement effect is much stronger for males than for females. Its multiplicative effect on the odds ratio is 2 to 5 times stronger for males than for females. Age also has a stronger effect for males.

Also, the discouragement effect is very strong in Germany, with more of 60 times increase in the odds ratio.

Institutional factors

While having a low educational level does not alter significantly the likelihood of making a UI type misperception, having been in education or training in the months before the interview reduces it dramatically¹⁷. In Agricultural regions this effect amounts to a tenfold reduction, in Declining Industrial regions it amounts to a four times reduction, while in the other regions it halves the likelihood of an error.

Institutional factors affect the odds ratio in the way we presumed. Each one hundred ecus increase in unemployment benefits increases it by 5 to 7 percent (14% in Agricultural regions). The effect is almost linear. On the other hand, each one hundred ecus increase in old age and survivor's benefits decreases the odds ratio by 2 to 4 percent (almost 10% in Agricultural regions). Sickness and invalidity benefits have an effect similar to that of pensions, with a decrease of the odds ratio of 1 to 2 percent (almost 10% in Agricultural regions) every 100 ecus increase in the benefits. Education related allowances do not appear to be significant in most regions. When they are, they decrease the odds ratio, as expected.

The interesting thing here is that socio-institutional factors (education and social benefits) have a much stronger effect in Agricultural regions. These are more traditional societies, where the distinction of different roles is probably more relevant.

No search and bad search

When running separate regressions for UI1 (no search) and UI2 (no active search) groups, the main thing to be noted is that the discouragement effect appears not to be significant for the first group, while very strong for the latter. This is highly reasonable, and confirms our interpretation that UI2 group is partly made of 'latent unemployed'. Bring just a little degree of confidence to the 42% of UI2 guys who declare to be discouraged, and they will be classified as unemployed. Overall, unemployment figure in the EU could go up as high as 0.6% because of this effect.

¹⁵ due to collinearity, some country dummies are dropped in each regressions.

¹⁶ data on gender regressions are available on request

¹⁷ we include this variable among the institutional factors since it involves a 'formal' recognition of an inactivity status. This is clearly very different from the overall level of education.

Table 10 – Discouragement and search

	UI1	UI2
discouraged	10.0 %	42.1 %
other inactive	90.0 %	57.9 %
total	100.0 %	100.0 %

Table 11 – UI1 and UI2 misperception logit regressions: Selected coefficients

Number of obs.	Declining Industrial regions								Agro-Industrial regions							
	UI1				UI2				UI1				UI2			
	18335				18335				9049				9049			
	O.R.	std. Errors	95% Confidence Interval		O.R.	std. Errors	95% Confidence Interval		O.R.	std. Errors	95% Confidence Interval		O.R.	std. Errors	95% Confidence Interval	
pe003_4	1.42	0.70	0.54	3.73	25.49	5.78	16.34	39.76	0.38	0.21	0.13	1.12	28.22	10.85	13.29	59.95
hi100ecu	1.00	0.00	0.99	1.00	1.00	0.00	0.99	1.00	1.00	0.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.00	1.00	1.01
pd003	1.12	0.04	1.04	1.21	1.19	0.06	1.07	1.32	1.34	0.06	1.23	1.46	1.70	0.14	1.44	1.99
pd004_2	0.45	0.10	0.29	0.69	0.51	0.11	0.33	0.78	0.62	0.10	0.45	0.86	0.51	0.16	0.28	0.94
pd005_1	0.44	0.10	0.28	0.68	0.45	0.12	0.27	0.75	0.79	0.14	0.56	1.12	1.02	0.38	0.49	2.11
pt001_1	0.17	0.05	0.09	0.29	0.43	0.11	0.26	0.71	0.32	0.09	0.18	0.55	1.07	0.42	0.50	2.30
empl12	2.40	0.51	1.58	3.64	2.51	0.52	1.67	3.76	2.71	0.66	1.69	4.35	2.16	0.75	1.09	4.29
Number of obs.	Metropolitan regions								Agricultural regions							
	UI1				UI2				UI1				UI2			
	1951				2065				21291				21421			
	O.R.	std. Errors	95% Confidence Interval		O.R.	std. Errors	95% Confidence Interval		O.R.	std. Errors	95% Confidence Interval		O.R.	std. Errors	95% Confidence Interval	
pe003_4	0.43	0.41	0.08	3.22	49.61	33.28	13.32	184.74	1.65	0.34	1.10	2.46	20.28	3.34	14.69	28.00
hi100ecu	1.00	0.00	1.00	1.01	1.00	0.00	0.99	1.00	1.00	0.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.00	1.00	1.00
pd003	0.97	0.09	0.81	1.17	1.16	0.14	0.92	1.46	1.16	0.04	1.09	1.23	1.11	0.04	1.02	1.20
pd004_2	1.07	0.57	0.38	3.04	2.89	1.81	0.85	9.88	0.37	0.06	0.27	0.51	0.49	0.09	0.34	0.71
pd005_1	2.03	1.41	0.52	7.88	0.53	0.38	0.13	2.18	0.20	0.04	0.13	0.30	0.28	0.06	0.19	0.43
pt001_1	0.46	0.36	0.10	2.11	0.55	0.61	0.06	4.80	0.16	0.04	0.10	0.26	0.10	0.03	0.06	0.17
empl12	1.48	0.91	0.45	4.92	5.40	3.86	1.33	21.92	2.85	0.47	2.06	3.93	0.83	0.15	0.58	1.18

The IU group

When regressing for the IU misperception group (those who declare to be inactive, but are classified as LFS unemployed, since they perform a correct job search), we have to drop the discouragement variable (LFS inactive because discouraged), since it is clearly correlated with the dependent variable (1 if LFS inactive, 0 otherwise). All other variables are the same we used for the UI regressions.

In some sense this perception error is the opposite of the UI one. Here, people are underemphasizing their efforts, rather than overemphasizing them: we thus expect most variables to affect the odds ratio in the opposite direction.

However, evidence on the discouragement effect is mixed. On one hand, total household income, as well as the savings dummy, are not significant. On the other hand, the age effect and the previous-employment effect confirm our hypothesis. In analysing the UI group, we found out that older people tend to overemphasise, and we related this to the discouragement effect. Here, data show that older people are less likely to underemphasise (commit a IU error): the effect is quite

important, with a decrease in the odds ratio that can reach –20% in Agro-Industrial regions. Moreover, it is much more significant for men than for women.

Having experienced a period of employment in the 12 months before the interview slashes the odds ratio to roughly a third.

The other effects also work in the way we supposed, i.e. in the opposite direction relative to the UI group. Each 100 ecus increase in unemployment benefits reduces the likelihood of a IU perception error of around 5%, while each 100 ecus increase in pensions increases it of 2-4%, thus confirming the existence of an important institutional effect. Family related allowances are important only in Agricultural regions, where they increase the odds ratio of almost 10%.

Everywhere, being a woman increases the likelihood of a IU misperception (from 2 to as high as 5 times)¹⁸. Also, being married leads to a 3 to 4 times increase, and this is particular true for women. This could be due, as for the UI misperception, to a smaller need for employment due to a social and family structure that, to a certain extent, takes care of women, and to cultural traditions suggesting a woman to declare to be inactive (student, involved with housework...), rather than unemployed, even if she is looking for a job.

The separate regression for German observations (see above) is of no special interest.¹⁹

¹⁸ data on gender regressions are available on request

¹⁹ data are available on request. The only striking feature is the effect of the dummy indicating possession of a home computer, which is significant and positive (odds ratio increased by a factor of 7!).

Table 12 - IU regression

IU	Declining Industrial regions				Agro-Industrial regions				Metropolitan regions				Agricultural regions			
Number of	2322				963				270				3202			
Wald chi2	217.3	32	d.o.f.		144.9	29	d.o.f.		1283	26	d.o.f.		488.0	29	d.o.f.	
	Odds Ratio	Robust std. Errors	95% Confidence Interval		Odds Ratio	Robust std. Errors	95% Confidence Interval		Odds Ratio	Robust std. Errors	95% Confidence Interval		Odds Ratio	Robust std. Errors	95% Confidence Interval	
hd004	0.915	0.078	0.774	1.083	0.948	0.126	0.730	1.231	0.982	0.196	0.663	1.452	0.979	0.063	0.863	1.112
hi100ecu	1.002	0.001	1.000	1.004	1.000	0.003	0.995	1.005	1.001	0.002	0.997	1.004	1.000	0.002	0.996	1.004
hi100esq	1.000	0.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.000	1.000	1.000
pi131ecu	0.951	0.009	0.933	0.969	0.954	0.013	0.929	0.979	0.954	0.015	0.926	0.984	0.944	0.019	0.908	0.982
pi131esq	1.000	0.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.000	1.000	1.001
pi132ecu	1.037	0.012	1.014	1.060	1.062	0.039	0.989	1.141	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.044	0.020	1.006	1.084
pi132esq	1.000	0.000	1.000	1.000	0.999	0.000	0.999	1.000	6.817	0.952	5.184	8.964	1.000	0.000	1.000	1.000
pi133ecu	1.012	0.008	0.996	1.028	1.029	0.011	1.008	1.051	0.981	0.024	0.935	1.028	1.093	0.030	1.036	1.153
pi133esq	1.000	0.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.000	1.000	1.001	0.999	0.000	0.998	1.000
pi134ecu	0.997	0.018	0.962	1.033	0.991	0.021	0.950	1.033	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.037	0.038	0.966	1.114
pi134esq	1.000	0.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.000	1.000	1.000	1.147	0.017	1.113	1.181	1.000	0.001	0.999	1.001
pi135ecu	1.013	0.039	0.939	1.092	1.073	0.057	0.967	1.190	0.544	0.150	0.317	0.936	6.236	8.819	0.390	99.695
pi135esq	1.000	0.001	0.999	1.002	1.000	0.001	0.997	1.003	1.029	0.012	1.006	1.053	0.833	0.194	0.528	1.313
ha022_1	1.398	0.225	1.019	1.917	1.730	0.400	1.100	2.722	1.512	0.635	0.664	3.443	1.153	0.158	0.882	1.508
hf013_2	1.131	0.194	0.809	1.583	0.630	0.147	0.399	0.996	0.414	0.223	0.144	1.192	0.884	0.152	0.631	1.239
hl002_1	1.009	0.326	0.536	1.899	0.657	0.424	0.185	2.328	3.569	3.454	0.536	23.78	0.663	0.265	0.303	1.449
pd003	0.901	0.038	0.829	0.979	0.776	0.052	0.680	0.885	1.436	0.217	1.067	1.932	0.987	0.039	0.913	1.067
pd003sq	1.001	0.001	1.000	1.002	1.003	0.001	1.001	1.005	0.995	0.002	0.991	0.999	1.000	0.001	0.999	1.001
pd004_2	3.181	0.505	2.331	4.341	2.036	0.492	1.268	3.270	1.495	0.585	0.695	3.218	5.163	0.775	3.847	6.930
pd005_1	3.300	0.664	2.225	4.896	4.060	1.280	2.189	7.531	3.533	1.756	1.334	9.359	4.439	0.822	3.088	6.382
pt001_1	2.067	0.355	1.477	2.893	2.875	0.677	1.812	4.561	1.570	0.768	0.602	4.096	6.151	1.056	4.394	8.610
pt022_3	1.190	0.184	0.879	1.611	0.768	0.182	0.483	1.221	0.660	0.257	0.308	1.418	1.327	0.191	1.000	1.761
pm008_ex	1.101	0.484	0.465	2.606	1.242	0.665	0.435	3.547	0.576	0.364	0.166	1.991	26.922	20.363	6.113	118.560
empl12	0.347	0.061	0.246	0.490	0.375	0.103	0.219	0.642	0.271	0.108	0.124	0.593	0.379	0.072	0.261	0.550

Instrumenting income

This section is devoted to finding a solution to a problem that probably does not deserve a solution. This is because we had a strong a-priori belief that income, and in particular work income, could affect the probability of a UE or a IE misperception (declaring to be unemployed or inactive while being recorded as employed by LFS standards). Including work income in these regressions could lead – as explained above – to an endogeneity problem, because the UE and IE types of misperception could reveal the individual as a particularly ‘active’ kind of unemployed, or retired, etc. Being ‘active’ in this sense could in turn be linked with motivation, or intrinsic ability, that also affect work income. Other components of income, as unemployment benefits or inactivity-related allowances are not affected by this endogeneity problem, as previously explained. However, it turns out that work income is *not* significant in the UE and IE regressions. In order to prove this result, however, we have to tackle the endogeneity problem.

We include among the regressors two ECHP variables as proxies for motivation: a dummy signalling whether the household is able to make ends meet only with difficulty, and a dummy signalling whether the household is able to save no or very little money. Our hypothesis is that being in financial distress adds to motivation (although, it must be noted, the reverse is not always true). Ability is only partially proxied by education²⁰. We thus consider the main problem to be the correlation of income and ability, and look for variables correlated with income, but not with ability, that may be used as instruments.

The number of hours worked per week, the presence of crime or vandalism in the area, age, sex, citizenship and health status of the individual²¹, plus the use of a foreign language in the current job seem to satisfy these two constraints. It is easy to argue that sex, citizenship and – to a certain degree – age and health status do not affect ability. Ability could be correlated with the number of hours worked, but the relationship is not clear (a ‘good type’ worker should work more, or be able to reach the same goals working less?). The use of a foreign language could signal ability. However, we are not concerned here with skills that can be learned with formal education or practice. Much more, we are interested in the intrinsic ability that makes the difference between two individuals with the same level of education, or belonging to the same social class, or with the same knowledge of a foreign language. We believe that is (relatively) easy to learn a foreign language, when needed, and thus suppose that this variable could be used as an instrument for income.

Clearly, all of these variables are strongly correlated with motivation. We think the problem with motivation is less relevant than with ability, because we already include two good proxies for the first unobservable in the regressions. Moreover, we do not see any other variable that could work as an instrument with respect to motivation. In the worst case, we solve only half of the problem. Moreover, as already anticipated, the issue appears to be relevant only theoretically, since the two income variables are never significant in the UE and IE regressions, both with and without the use of the instruments for unobserved ability. It appears unlikely that instrumenting for motivation could overturn this result.

²⁰ Our variable for education is a simple dummy signalling whether the individual completed less than a second stage of secondary education (ISCED 0-2).

²¹ including information on health increases the number of missing data, but the scarcity of instruments justifies it. The percentage of missing data on health status is reported below:

Germany	1.9%	Belgium	0.8%	United-Kingdom	12.1%	Greece	2.4%	Austria	0.0%
Denmark	0.1%	Luxembourg	0.4%	Ireland	0.3%	Spain	1.3%	Finland	8.6%
The Netherlands	0.0%	France	0.7%	Italy	0.0%	Portugal	0.8%		

So, we run two separate tobit regressions for income (total household income and personal work income) on the instruments²², and include the predicted value in the UE and IE regressions. In order to obtain good estimates for the standard errors of this two income coefficients, we bootstrap them.

The UE and IE groups

Here, we want to describe the characteristics of part-time workers who declare to be unemployed, or inactive, and try to give a tentative explanation of the reasons behind this perception. The alternative of course is stating the main activity is the part-time job itself. 462 people – or 13.7% – out of 3367 part-time workers in facts declare the part-time job as their main activity, while 2461 – or 73.1% – declare to be inactive and 444 – or 13.2% – declare to be unemployed.

We will thus regress UE and IE people against workers stating their main activity is the part-time job²³.

We want to test the two hypothesis we discussed above – namely the “lack of centrality” and the ‘institutional’ explanation.

Since the importance of a certain activity is directly linked to the amount of time devoted to it, and to the resources it generates, we expect that the first hypothesis would imply a strong positive coefficient for the number of hours worked and the work income variables. On the other hand, the ‘institutional’ hypothesis would imply a positive coefficient for social allowances. After controlling for the usual social and demographic conditions, we conclude that there is a slight evidence in favour of the ‘institutional’ hypothesis, while there is no evidence supporting the “lack of centrality” one.

Financial distress is relevant in declaring to be unemployed (we would say ‘underemployed’) only in group 1 (Declining Industrial) regions, where it increases the odds ratio of as much as 20 times! Being a foreigner can sometimes increase the likelihood of declaring to be unemployed, and decrease the likelihood of declaring to be inactive. The country dummy for the Netherlands is extremely significant (90n times increase in the odds ratio for the UE group, and 4.5 times increase for the IE group).

²² see Appendix

²³ another possibility would be to regress UE people against self assessed unemployed not working at all, and IE people against self assessed inactive not working at all. This choice would be functional to trying to understand why some unemployed, or some inactive, work and some others don't, while we're here interested in why these people don't state their main activity status as worker.

Table 13 - UE regression

UE	Declining Industrial regions				Agro-Industrial regions				Metropolitan regions				Agricultural regions			
Number of obs. used	224				400				outcome pe005<=1 predicts data perfectly				223			
Wald chi2	76592				131.42								705634			
	25 d.o.f.				22 d.o.f.								20 d.o.f.			
	Odds Ratio	Robust std. Errors	95% Confidence Interval		Odds Ratio	Robust std. Errors	95% Confidence Interval		Odds Ratio	Robust std. Errors	95% Confidence Interval		Odds Ratio	Robust std. Errors	95% Confidence Interval	
pe005	0.517	0.267	0.188	1.425	1.017	0.518	0.375	2.760					0.321	0.195	0.097	1.056
hi100hat	1.251	0.951	0.277	5.655	1.080	0.223	0.716	1.628					0.815	0.288	0.404	1.644
hi100hsq	0.999	0.001	0.997	1.001	1.000	0.000	0.999	1.000					1.000	0.000	0.999	1.001
pi110hat	1.271	0.771	0.382	4.234	0.977	0.246	0.593	1.608					1.591	0.738	0.634	3.993
pi110hsq	1.000	0.000	1.000	1.001	1.000	0.000	1.000	1.000					1.000	0.000	1.000	1.000
pi131ecu	1.227	0.083	1.074	1.402	1.071	0.022	1.028	1.115					1.142	0.076	1.002	1.301
pi131esq	0.999	0.001	0.998	1.000	1.000	0.000	0.999	1.000					0.998	0.002	0.995	1.001
hf002_no	20.190	17.064	3.853	1.1E+02	0.628	0.253	0.285	1.383					0.856	0.562	0.237	3.097
hf013_2	0.866	0.600	0.223	3.364	1.884	0.791	0.827	4.289					2.234	1.403	0.652	7.651
ha022_1	0.078	0.128	0.003	1.905	0.669	1.078	0.028	15.739					0.038	0.076	0.001	1.890
hi002_1	0.824	1.079	0.063	10.734	0.395	0.245	0.117	1.332					0.547	0.607	0.062	4.817
pd003	0.178	0.323	0.005	6.195	1.354	2.487	0.037	49.621					0.025	0.053	0.000	1.589
pd003sq	1.018	0.020	0.980	1.058	0.996	0.020	0.958	1.036					1.040	0.024	0.995	1.088
pd004_2	181.956	1125.578	0.001	3.4E+07	0.176	1.059	0.000	2.4E+04					6.7E+04	4.6E+05	0.081	5.5E+10
pd005_1	0.432	0.370	0.081	2.315	0.602	0.313	0.218	1.669					0.598	0.289	0.232	1.543
pt022_3	0.772	0.510	0.211	2.820	1.235	0.532	0.531	2.872					0.401	0.232	0.129	1.249
pm008_ex	97.920	233.316	0.918	1.0E+04	0.281	0.296	0.036	2.210					dropped due to collinearity			
c_nl					89.703	98.946	10.325	7.8E+02								

hi100hat	predicted hi100ecu	s.e. bootstrapped	normal confidence interval
hi100hsq	squared	s.e. bootstrapped	normal confidence interval
pi110hat	predicted pi110ecu	s.e. bootstrapped	normal confidence interval
pi110hsq	squared	s.e. bootstrapped	normal confidence interval

Table 14 - IE regression

IE	Declining Industrial regions				Agro-Industrial regions				Metropolitan regions				Agricultural regions			
Number of obs. used	907				799				20				649			
Wald chi2	311420	33	d.o.f.		136.53	29	d.o.f.		too little observations				599287	27	d.o.f.	
	Odds Ratio	Robust std. Errors	95% Confidence Interval		Odds Ratio	Robust std. Errors	95% Confidence Interval		Odds Ratio	Robust std. Errors	95% Confidence		Odds Ratio	Robust std. Errors	95% Confidence Interval	
pe005	0.820	0.298	0.403	1.671	0.838	0.325	0.392	1.791					0.578	0.228	0.267	1.250
hd004	1.137	0.241	0.751	1.721	1.251	0.302	0.780	2.007					1.505	0.234	1.109	2.042
hi100hat	0.851	0.135	0.621	1.166	1.138	0.205	0.796	1.626					0.810	0.166	0.539	1.216
hi100hsq	1.000	0.000	1.000	1.001	1.000	0.000	0.999	1.000					1.000	0.000	1.000	1.001
pi110hat	1.082	0.182	0.775	1.511	1.049	0.220	0.691	1.591					1.259	0.344	0.732	2.164
pi110hsq	1.000	0.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.000	1.000	1.000					1.000	0.000	1.000	1.000
pi132ecu	1.008	0.008	0.993	1.023	1.022	0.011	1.000	1.045					1.007	0.018	0.972	1.043
pi132esq	1.000	0.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.000	1.000	1.000					1.000	0.000	1.000	1.000
pi133ecu	1.073	0.038	1.000	1.151	1.023	0.034	0.958	1.092					0.932	0.062	0.819	1.061
pi133esq	1.000	0.000	0.999	1.000	1.000	0.000	0.999	1.000					1.002	0.001	1.000	1.004
pi134ecu	1.034	0.035	0.969	1.104	1.022	0.033	0.960	1.088					0.893	0.089	0.735	1.085
pi134esq	1.000	0.000	0.999	1.000	1.000	0.000	1.000	1.000					1.006	0.003	1.000	1.012
pi135ecu	1.219	0.107	1.026	1.448	0.977	0.059	0.868	1.100					dropped (predicts failure perfectly): 9 obs. not used			
pi135esq	0.998	0.001	0.996	1.000	0.999	0.001	0.997	1.002					dropped due to collinearity			
hf002_no	0.820	0.293	0.407	1.653	0.759	0.355	0.303	1.898					0.945	0.406	0.407	2.193
hf013_2	0.604	0.223	0.293	1.246	0.707	0.318	0.293	1.708					1.579	0.719	0.647	3.854
ha022_1	0.348	0.414	0.034	3.579	0.295	0.352	0.029	3.054					0.048	0.060	0.004	0.565
hl002_1	1.102	0.686	0.325	3.732	5.683	5.049	0.996	32.418					0.473	0.315	0.128	1.745
pd003	0.425	0.532	0.036	4.952	0.440	0.575	0.034	5.686					0.112	0.155	0.007	1.693
pd003sq	1.009	0.014	0.983	1.036	1.009	0.014	0.981	1.037					1.025	0.015	0.995	1.055
pd004_2	15.647	64.252	0.005	4.9E+04	6.124	26.320	0.001	2.8E+04					346.643	1564.53	0.050	2.4E+06
pd005_1	1.294	0.600	0.522	3.210	1.174	0.593	0.436	3.159					1.568	0.731	0.628	3.910
pt001_1	1.190	0.495	0.526	2.691	2.711	1.827	0.724	10.157					2.428	1.312	0.841	7.003
pt022_3	0.935	0.317	0.481	1.818	0.952	0.331	0.482	1.881					0.714	0.303	0.311	1.639
pm008_ex	18.452	31.916	0.622	5.5E+02	0.038	0.042	0.004	0.328					dropped (predicts failure perfectly): 1 obs. not used			
c_nl					4.619	2.884	1.359	15.705								
c_be					0.310	0.232	0.072	1.340								
c_es					0.019	0.015	0.004	0.088								

hi100hat predicted hi100ecu s.e. bootstrapped normal confidence interval
 hi100hsq squared s.e. bootstrapped normal confidence interval
 pi110hat predicted pi110ecu s.e. bootstrapped normal confidence interval
 pi110hsq squared s.e. bootstrapped normal confidence interval

7. Goodness of fit

As already mentioned, understanding the link between the two classifications of labour status can help in reducing the dimension of (unexplained) measurement error to be taken into account when analysing transition flows using datasets that do not contain the desired classification.

$$[2 \text{ repeated}] \quad \alpha_{ijh} = pr[l_i = j | l_i^* = h] = g_{jh}(z_i' \gamma) + m_{jh}^l, \quad \alpha_{jh} \in [0,1]$$

Since we try to explain directly the (respondent) measurement error itself, the point is how ‘good’ are our estimates, i.e. how big are the residuals from our regressions.

In a logit setting, there is no obvious measure of fit, differently from the linear case where the estimates are derived exactly through maximisation of a measure of fit.

We propose a measure based on performing a simple ANOVA analysis on the predicted outcome of our regression, μ_i , on the dependent variable m_i :

$$[6] \quad R_\mu^2 = \frac{\text{var}(\text{between})}{\text{var}(\text{total})} = \frac{\text{var}[E(\mu_j)]}{\text{var}[\mu_i]} = \frac{E[(E(\mu_j) - E(\mu_i))^2]}{E[(\mu_i - E(\mu_i))^2]}$$

where μ_j , $j = (0, 1)$ is the mean predicted probability μ_i for the two groups $l_i = 0$ and $l_i = 1$.


This is different from Efron’s (1978) fit measure, where the sum of squared errors is related to the variance of the dependent variable:

$$[7] \quad R_{Ef}^2 = 1 - \frac{E[(l_i - \mu_i)^2]}{E[(l_i - E[l_i])^2]}$$

Compared with other measures proposed in the literature sharing the same approach (*i.e.* comparing the distribution of the predicted probability within the two success and failure groups), as that of Cramer (1999) we also provide²⁴, the ANOVA has the advantage of allowing a simple interpretation in terms of percentage of explained variance. With reference to the figure below, Cramer index only compares μ_0 with μ_1 , the mean predicted probability for the two groups. The ANOVA index takes into consideration also the moment of degree 2 of the two distributions, and compares them with the variance of the overall distribution.

²⁴ Cramer suggests to use $\lambda = (\text{average } \mu \mid m_i = 1) - (\text{average } \mu \mid m_i = 0)$. Anova also compares average values in the two different outcome groups, but considers also the variance within those groups.

Figure 3 – measures of fit



Another classical measure of fit considers an arbitrary cut-off point, x^* , and compares the number of well classified and wrongly classified observations. A cut-off point of 0.5 is often chosen. This is definitely inadequate in most cases, as the position and shape of the two distributions are not considered. We look for a cut-off point such that the sum of the frequency of wrongly classified observations within the two groups ($\Sigma = A_1 + A_0$) is minimised. This is a particular case of a more general approach considering different weights for the two errors, where $\Sigma = w_1 A_1 + w_0 A_0$ is minimised, with $w_0 + w_1 = 1$. We take this value Σ , which is confined in the range between 0 (perfect discrimination) and 1 (no discrimination), as another measure of fit. If we accept to make few (reasonable) assumptions on the shape of the distributions, the cut-off point that will minimise Σ would also equal A_1 and A_0 .

Results for the four group show acceptable results for the UI and IU groups, with a reduction in the overall variance of 35% and 23%, respectively. The Σ index²⁵ is particularly good for the UI group, with a value as low as 0.31. This is coherent with the results from our regressions, where we found most variables to be significant. UE and IE group can very poorly be explained in terms of individual characteristics. While the reduction in the first two types of respondent measurement error is significant (although we can't get any indication on the relative importance of respondent and interviewer measurement error from ECHP data), the reduction in the last two types of respondent measurement errors is negligible.

²⁵ the shape of the Σ functions is showed in the Appendix.

Table 15 – Measures of fit

	$R^2(\mu)$	Between Variance	Within Variance	Cramer's λ	cut-off point	Σ
UI	0.35	305.0	555.2	0.36	0.08	0.31
IU	0.23	60.0	198.0	0.23	0.22	0.52
UE	0.00	29.5	6,608.4	0.26	0.57	0.58
IE	0.01	28.6	2,291.5	0.12	0.81	0.69

8. Conclusions

In this paper, we used ECHP data to investigate the effect of social, economical and institutional factors on labour status perception. We focused on those situations when the individual perception differs from the categorisation offered by the LFS (and imputed in the ECHP data), based on ILO definitions of employment, unemployment and participation to the labour force. We offered an explanation for the misperception, and described four main groups of ‘borderline’ individuals, the most interesting being those who declare to be unemployed while recorded as inactive, and those who declare to be inactive when recorded as unemployed. The first group is overemphasizing the job seeking efforts, while the second is underemphasizing them. ‘Victimisation’, i.e. considering society in general responsible for an individual’s current working situation, and the discouragement associated with it, is shown to be the main cause for being in this group. Such an attitude is (paradoxically) reinforced by assistance from the state itself, such that belonging to this group becomes ‘institutionalised’. These people do not compare in the unemployment statistics, but amount to an overall 35% of all (‘official’) unemployed workers in the European Union. This figure is around 30% in Italy, Germany, France, Ireland, reaching 50% and beyond in Portugal, Austria, Denmark and passing that of recorded unemployed in Belgium and the Netherlands. It is around 10% in Great Britain and Greece. These individuals are more or less dissatisfied as their ‘official’ counterparts, they vote, and thus would deserve the same attention as their more visible cousins. But bringing a little bit of hope and a little searching practice to them would increase the overall unemployment rate in the EU of as much as 3%!

People underemphasizing their search efforts on the other side can normally rely on a family safety net (married women...), but their attitude is again reinforced by ‘institutional’ care. Also quite interesting are those part-time workers that declare to be either unemployed or inactive, since they could signal a positive attitude in dealing with their main status.

All the evidence provided in this paper points to an inadequacy of labour statistics in keeping track of the complex reality of work and leisure time, an inadequacy that has a significant impact on the possibility of interregional comparisons of labour figures.

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Appendix

Table A1- Persons by current activity status (ECHIP versus LFS, 1994 and 1995)

	Wave 1				Wave 2			
	Working %		Unemployed % (1)		Working %		Unemployed % (1)	
	ECHIP	LFS	ECHIP	LFS	ECHIP	LFS	ECHIP	LFS
B	50	46	5	5	48	46	3	5
DK	61	59	6	5	63	60	4	5
D	55	53	5	5	56	53	4	5
EL	46	45	8	4	43	45	5	4
F	41	37	12	12	40	37	11	11
IRL	46	48	7	7	50	49	5	7
I	46	46	9	8	50	48	6	6
L	44	42	8	5	43	42	7	6
NL	53	52	2	2	53	49	2	2
A	54	55	4	4	57	55	3	4
P	59	54	4	4	57	57	2	2
UK	58	56	6	6	57	54	3	4
(1) over population aged 25-64								
Source: ECHIP data quality, second report, pp. 45.								

Table A2- Unemployment and participation rates (ECHIP versus LFS, 1994, 1995, 1996)

	Unemployment %		Participation %	
	ECHIP	LFS	ECHIP	LFS
Italy				
wave 2	13.9%	11.9	49.4%	47.4
wave 3	14.1%	12.1	44.3%	47.7
Germany				
wave 2	6.7%	8.2	59.5%	57.7
wave 3	6.0%	8.8	59.0%	57.6
Great Britain				
wave 2	8.8%	8.7	62.5%	61.5
wave 3	7.5%	8.2	61.7%	61.6
Portugal				
wave 2	5.7%	7.3	59.8%	58.1
wave 3	5.1%	7.4	58.9%	57.7
Netherlands				
wave 2	4.7%	7	58.8%	59.2
wave 3	6.1%	6.2	60.0%	59.7
Belgium				
wave 2	6.5%	9.4	49.7%	50.5
wave 3	11.6%	9.6	50.7%	50.4
Spain				
wave 2	21.3%	23.1	52.3%	48.2
wave 3	22.1%	22.5	50.2%	48.8
France				
wave 2	9.9%	11.3	56.8%	55.4
wave 3	11.0%	12	56.6%	55.8
Greece				
wave 2	11.0%	9.1	49.1%	49.2
wave 3	10.7%	9.7	49.7%	49.7
Denmark				
wave 2	6.3%	7.4	67.7%	64.6
wave 3	5.9%	7.4	65.7%	65.2
Austria				
wave 2	4.0%	3.9	56.8%	59.4
wave 3	4.1%	4.5	58.5%	58.8
Ireland				
wave 1	16.5%	14.7	54.8%	53.9
wave 2	11.3%	12.2	55.6%	53.9
wave 3	10.8%	11.8	55.4%	54.9
Luxemburg				
wave 2	3.0%	2.8	55.5%	50.8
wave 3	3.7%	3.1	51.7%	51
Finland				
wave 3	17.1%	15.5	59.0%	59.4

Table A3 - LFS main activity during current year

Codes	Labels
1	normally working (working 15+ hours / week)
2	currently working (working less than 15 hours / week)
3	unemployed
4	discouraged worker
5	economically inactive
-9	missing
Source: ECHP – UDB, data dictionary and description of variables	

Table A4 - Variable construction rule

working at present at least 15 h/w or temporarily absent for some reason (vacation, sickness, bad weather, labour dispute, maternity leave...)			1
else	any work in a job or business during the past 7 days, even if this was only for one or a few hours		2
	else	person has no job but is looking for a job	3
		available to start within two weeks and active search to find a job	3
		available to start within two weeks and received a job offer during past 4 weeks	3
		available to start within two weeks and no active search because believe no suitable work available	4
		available to start within two weeks and and no active search because already found work, to start in future or awaiting outcome of application or interview	3
		else	5
		person has no job and is not looking for a job	4
		available to start within two weeks and no active search because engaged in other activity (study, training, community or military service)	4
		available to start within two weeks and no active search because and already found work, to start in future or awaiting outcome of application or interview	3
		else	5
	else		-9

Source: ECHP Variable Construction Manual – European Commission Doc. Pan 167/01, adapted by the authors

Please note that code 2 of LFS classification has a misleading label (“working less than 15 hours a week”). In facts, respondents are assigned code 2 if they declare not to have a regular job involving at least 15 hours a week, but to have done some kind of work in any job or business in the week prior to the interview. A more appropriate label would thus be “temporary or part-time work”. Around 3% of the code 2 people actually revealed to work for more than 15 hours per week.

Table A5 – Eligibility for objectives 1 and 2 and regional classification

EU nut	label	eli1	eli2	group
at	OSTERREICH			2
at1	OSTOSTERREICH	P	P	2
at2	SUDOSTERREICH	N	P	1
at3	WESTOSTERREICH	N	P	1
be	BELGIQUE-BELGIE	P	P	2
be1	BRUXELLES	N	N	3
be2	VLAAMS GEWEST	N	P	1
be3	REGION WALLONE	P	P	2
de	BR DEUTSCHLAND	P	P	2
dk	DANMARK	N	P	1
es	ESPAÑA	P	P	2
es1	NOROESTE	T	N	4
es2	NORESTE	N	P	1
es3	MADRID	N	P	1
es4	CENTRO (E)	T	N	4
es5	ESTE	P	P	2
es6	SUR	T	N	4
es7	CANARIAS	T	N	4
fi	SUOMI/FINLAND	N	P	1
fi1	MANNER-SUOMI	N	P	1
fi2	AHVENANMAA/ALAND	N	P	1
fr	FRANCE	P	P	2
fr1	ILE DE FRANCE	N	N	3
fr2	BASSIN PARISIEN	N	N	3
fr3	NORD-PAS-DE-CALAIS	P	P	2
fr4	EST	N	P	1
fr5	OUEST	N	P	1
fr6	SUD-OUEST	N	P	1
fr7	CENTRE-EST	N	P	1
fr8	MEDITERRANEE	P	P	2
gr	ELLADA	T	N	4
gr1	VOREIA ELLADA	T	N	4
gr2	KENTRIKI ELLADA	T	N	4
gr3	ATTIKI	T	N	4
gr4	NISIA	T	N	4
ie	IRELAND	T	N	4
it	ITALIA	P	P	2
it1	NORD OVEST	N	P	1
it2	LOMBARDIA	N	P	1
it3	NORD EST	N	P	1
it4	EMILIA-ROMAGNA	N	P	1
it5	CENTRO (I)	N	P	1
it6	LAZIO	N	P	1
it7	ABRUZZI-MOLISE	T	N	4
it8	CAMPANIA	T	N	4
it9	SUD	T	N	4
ita	SICILIA	T	N	4
itb	SARDEGNA	T	N	4
lu	LUXEMBOURG	N	P	1
nl	NEDERLAND	P	P	2
nl1	NOORD-NEDERLAND	N	P	1
nl2	OOST-NEDERLAND	P	P	2
nl3	WEST-NEDERLAND	N	N	3
nl4	ZUID-NEDERLAND	N	P	1
pt	PORTUGAL	T	N	4
pt1	CONTINENTE	T	N	4
pt11	NORTE	T	N	4
pt12	CENTRO	T	N	4
pt13	LISBOA E VALE DO TEJO	T	N	4
pt14	ALENTEJO	T	N	4
pt15	ALGARVE	T	N	4
pt2	ACORES	T	N	4
pt3	MADEIRA	T	N	4
uk	UNITED KINGDOM	P	P	2
uk1	NORTH	N	P	1
uk2	YORKSHIRE & HUMBERSIDE	N	P	1
uk3	EAST MIDLANDS	N	P	1
uk4	EAST ANGLIA	N	N	3
uk5	SOUTH EAST (UK)	N	P	1
uk6	SOUTH WEST (UK)	N	P	1
uk7	WEST MIDLANDS	N	P	1
uk8	NORTH WEST (UK)	P	P	2
uk9	WALES	N	P	1
uka	SCOTLAND	P	P	2
ukb	NORTHERN IRELAND	T	N	4

Table A6 - Observations with missing regional information (excluded from the sample):

country	Freq.	Percent
Denmark	61	1.53
Belgium	6	0.15
Luxembourg	78	1.95
France	1402	35.1
United-Kingdom	49	1.23
Ireland	663	16.6
Italy	33	0.83
Greece	706	17.68
Spain	61	1.53
Portugal	789	19.75
Austria	146	3.66
Total	3994	100.00

Table A7 - Auxiliary Income regressions

Tobit estimates	Number of obs	=	66283			
	LR chi2(8)	=	1432.35			
	Prob > chi2	=	0			
Log likelihood =	-436386.6	Pseudo R2	= 0.0016			
hi100ecu	Coef.	Std.Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
pe005	0.687	0.077	8.958	0.000	0.537	0.837
pe005sq	-0.006	0.001	-4.899	0.000	-0.008	-0.004
ha022_1	-1.809	1.989	-0.909	0.363	-5.707	2.090
pd003	6.861	0.337	20.366	0.000	6.201	7.521
pd003sq	-0.077	0.004	-19.084	0.000	-0.085	-0.069
pd004_2	12.304	1.445	8.518	0.000	9.473	15.135
ph001	-24.954	0.890	-28.032	0.000	-26.699	-23.210
pm008_ex	4.893	6.790	0.721	0.471	-8.415	18.202
_cons	151.111	6.896	21.912	0.000	137.594	164.627
_se	179.865	0.496 (Ancillary		parameter)		
Obs. summary:	338 left-censored observations at hi100ecu<=0 65945 uncensored observations					

Tobit estimates	Number of obs	=	66283			
	LR chi2(8)	=	17146.43			
	Prob > chi2	=	0			
Log likelihood =	-356123.6	Pseudo R2	= 0.0235			
pi110ecu	Coef.	Std.Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
pe005	5.259	0.059	89.010	0.000	5.144	5.375
pe005sq	-0.044	0.001	-50.711	0.000	-0.046	-0.042
ha022_1	5.273	1.363	3.867	0.000	2.600	7.945
pd003	11.817	0.239	49.501	0.000	11.349	12.285
pd003sq	-0.127	0.003	-44.293	0.000	-0.133	-0.121
pd004_2	-25.581	0.994	-25.736	0.000	-27.529	-23.633
ph001	-13.989	0.617	-22.672	0.000	-15.198	-12.780
pm008_ex	0.368	4.695	0.078	0.937	-8.834	9.571
_cons	-229.066	4.912	-46.635	0.000	-238.693	-219.438
_se	120.057	0.365 (Ancillary		parameter)		
Obs. summary:	10114 left-censored observations at pi110ecu<=0 56159 uncensored observations					

Figure A1 – determination of Σ

